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ABSTRACT: We present an account of the evolutionary development of the experiences of 
empathy that marked the beginning of morality and art. We argue that aesthetic and moral 
capacities provided an important foundation for later epistemic developments. The distinction 
between phenomenal consciousness and attention is discussed, and a role for phenomenology 
in cognitive archaeology is justified—critical sources of evidence used in our analysis are based 
on the archaeological record. We claim that what made our species unique was a form of 
meditative and empathic thinking that made large-scale human cooperation possible through 
pre-linguistic, empathic communication. A critical aspect of this proposal is that the 
transformation that led to the dawn of our species was not initially driven by semantic or 
epistemic factors, although clearly, these factors increased the gap between us and other species 
dramatically later on. Our proposal suggests that recent philosophy of mind and psychology 
might have “epistemicized” phenomenal consciousness too much by construing it in terms of 
semantic content rather than by describing it in terms of empathic and meditative thinking. 
Instead of the prevailing approach, we favor the type of subjectivity that is fundamentally 
“other-involving” as essential, because on our account, a necessary condition for subjectivity is 
the empathic understanding of other individuals’ psychology, not through inference or 
judgment, but through immediate conscious engagement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
At some point in the evolution of our species, we became accustomed to the immediate 
and automatic conceptualization of semantic contents. Besides its automaticity, this 
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phenomenon is pervasive in our mental lives: when we perceive, desire, hope, think 
and remember, we do so systematically towards some specific content, a phenomenon 
that Franz Brentano famously called the “intentional inexistence” or the aboutness of 
mental states. This automatic type of conceptual attention is at the very basis of our 
perceptual and cognitive systems. Whenever this transition occurred, the 
transformation was dramatic. In fact, it has been argued that no other species has the 
capacities for the vast conceptual representation and combinatorial-hierarchical syntax 
that characterizes human linguistic communication (Berwick and Chomsky, 2016). 
Components of language exist across species, but not in the powerfully abstract, 
representational and hierarchical way that characterizes human language.  
Many paradigms in experimental psychology demonstrate the automaticity and 
robustness of our linguistic and conceptual capacities, as well as how much they affect 
and interact with perceptual processes. Take for instance the Stroop task. Two strong 
and deeply related conscious urges, reporting the color of a perceptual stimulus and 
naming a word, are forced apart with a simple instruction: name the color of the word. 
Red written in red is the congruous condition; red written in a different color, the 
incongruous condition, which slows down subjects’ responses. Both of these capacities 
(i.e., color and word identification) are conceptual. But one is partly served by much 
older mechanisms. Color recognition, even if conceptually guided in human beings, is 
a widespread capacity in the animal kingdom. Word recognition as such, by contrast, 
may be an exclusively human capacity (at least in the systematic, productive and 
hierarchical way in which it occurs in humans). Color experiences, therefore, may lead 
to forms of perception, emotion and thinking that are independent of the highly 
structured conceptual capacities we have, and which rely on the older emotional brain, 
in the limbic system (Pauers et al., 2012).  
The dramatic change our species experienced when it acquired the language 
capacity can be defined in terms of attention routines. Before this change, attention was 
driven by feature detection, emotion integration, and experience geared towards 
action. In many mammals, attention is integrated with social cues that are the basis for 
empathy and bonding. After this epistemic change in humans, attention became 
linguistically and conceptually guided. The color of things probably didn’t change after 
this transition. But colours became concepts, and this is a very dramatic transition 
indeed.1 It is because of the deep, perhaps a priori relation, between conceptual 
representation and linguistic cognition that philosophy, particularly in the West, has 
                                                          
1 We will not argue for the stronger claim that concept representation necessitates language. All we need 
for the purposes of this paper is the weaker claim that concept representation plays a fundamental role in 
linguistic representation and that linguistic and conceptual capacities systematically overlap. 
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assumed that categorizations and conceptual judgments are the human species’ most 
basic capacities, the essence of our rational nature and the foundation of what 
separated us from other species.2 Here we take a different approach by reversing the 
“concepts and language first” order of explanation regarding what made us uniquely 
human.  
We defend two theses. First, we argue that what made our species unique in the 
earliest stages of our evolution was not the language capacity, but an empathically 
normative capacity for thinking non-perceptually or abstractly—a form of thinking that 
is fundamentally related to human spiritual and moral capacities. These capacities are 
essentially related to the intrinsic moral value of phenomenal consciousness—the kind 
of consciousness associated with subjective experience (Montemayor and Haladjian, 
2015). Conscious experiences that immediately reflect how others may feel are the basis 
for the value of our lives (and deaths) and the lives of other conscious beings. 
Obviously, linguistic capacities may also be unique to us, but they did not seem to have 
originally demarcated the transition that set us apart at the earliest stages of human 
evolution. Although the language capacity seems to be uniquely human, our aesthetic 
and moral experiences also seem to be uniquely human—or at the very least, the degree 
to which they impact our conscious awareness. This is to a large extent an empirical 
claim, which we justify below.  
The second thesis is that this initial differentiation of our species is not merely a 
transition concerning the format of our thoughts or propositional attitudes, from 
unstructured perception to cognition. Different forms of conscious attention, which are 
distinctive of our species, emerged at different points in our evolution, but the moral 
and aesthetic aspects of phenomenal consciousness were fundamental in shaping a 
different interaction with conspecifics and with a new environment in which value 
becomes fundamental to such interactions. The linguistic capacities made the 
distinction between our species and the rest of the animal kingdom even more 
dramatic. Value, however, was not dependent on accessing and evaluating semantic 
contents and these valuable experiences likely developed before these epistemic 
developments. We were spiritual before we started manipulating nature through 
                                                          
2 The claim that conceptual and epistemic capacities, which are manifest in logic and the structure of 
language, are what make us not only unique, but free and autonomous, is a revered thesis of Western 
philosophy, famously endorsed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, and it can be traced back to the 
origins of Western philosophy, particularly the work of Plato and Aristotle. We explain below, in the 
second part of the paper, how this narrative of our psychological archaeology may need to be revised, 
even for its historical accuracy with respect to Greek philosophy. Our analysis of the evidence on 
psychological archaeology thus confirms many of the views defended by Iain McGilchrist (2009), and 
develops them further. 
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language. 
The contemporary view of human nature, rooted in modern philosophy, places 
epistemic capacities at the center of our development as a species. We propose a 
reversal of ideology, not merely based on intuitions, but on the available empirical 
evidence and a detailed phenomenological analysis. Our initial distinctive nature was, 
we shall argue, based on empathic and analogical reasoning. Only more recently did 
we become productive and systematic namers, judgers, and distinguishers. Phenomenal 
consciousness has value independently of the epistemic capacities we associate with 
rationality and language. In justifying these claims we use a cognitive archaeological 
approach, but not with an eye on planning and tool making, but rather on the early 
artistic expressions of our species. 
Our approach is very much in line with Iain McGilchrist’s (2009) account of the 
divide between the empathic and epistemically obsessive aspects of our minds. 
However, the evidence we cover and the theoretical apparatus we use differ. The 
evidence we review supports McGilchrist’s thesis that there are two different 
neurological functions, one associated with conceptual and epistemic manipulation and 
another one associated with emotions and empathy. But instead of using neurological 
and psychiatric evidence, we base our approach on the consciousness and attention-
dissociation framework (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015) and on a cognitive 
archaeological approach. An important difference with the original proposal regarding 
the dissociation between consciousness and attention is that here we explain how it is 
not only the case that phenomenal consciousness is valuable, morally and aesthetically 
(independently of the epistemic functions of attention and access to semantic contents) 
but also that this dissociation has historical and social consequences.3  
There is also significant overlap between our historical and phenomenological 
interpretation and Arran Gare’s (2012) philosophical analysis of McGilchrist’s proposals. 
The main difference is that while Gare focuses on Nietzsche we focus on the late 
Heidegger and an interpretation of Greek philosophy that emphasizes the importance 
of Pyrrhonian skepticism. With this analysis, we hope to illuminate how the purpose of 
the skeptical practices of the Pyrrhonians was to stop our attention-based tendencies to 
control and manipulate in order to allow for contemplation (and even spirituality), or at 
least that this is a plausible interpretation of such practices. We focus first on the 
empirical evidence. 
                                                          
3 We will not discuss the important issue of what is the nature and value of knowledge. For a sustained 
discussion of this issue that explains how knowledge is related to attention see Fairweather and 
Montemayor, 2017. 
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2.THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON OUR UNIQUENESS AS A SPECIES 
Issues like the transition from color perception to conceptual and linguistic color 
identification raise the question: when exactly did this transition occur? There is 
substantial evidence, presented in this section, which strongly suggests that it is a very 
recent development in our evolution. In fact, if it is true that the capacity to articulate 
and combine strings of symbols hierarchically occurred as recently as 200 to 150,000 
years ago (Berwick and Chomsky, 2016, p. 54, indicate that it is only 60,000 years ago 
that it certainly emerged), then it must be one of the most recent events in our evolution. 
In this section, we examine evidence in support of the view that what initially 
distinguished our species, prior to the language capacity, was an empathic and abstract 
form of thinking that did not depend on explicit symbolic representation. By “explicit 
symbolic representation” we mean the deliberate conscious effort to use a sign 
conceptually, in order to store, manipulate and describe information in a hierarchical 
linguistic format.  
What were the cognitive requirements for these cognitive transitions to occur? This 
is a crucial question about which we maintain a neutral perspective. We believe that 
certainly memory enhancements were necessary for the transition into empathic and 
abstract thinking, as well as complex forms of planning (Coolidge and Wynn, 2016). 
However, these enhancements by themselves may not be sufficient to explain aesthetic 
and moral capacities. We are not going to speculate about which areas of the brain or 
which specific mechanisms and models could explain the functioning of this form of 
empathic thinking. What is crucial for our purposes is that this kind of empathic 
thinking, according to the available evidence, seems to have appeared prior to the 
language capacity. This claim, in itself, is of interest to cognitive archaeology, and we 
explore it at length below. In section 3, we offer a theoretical and phenomenological 
account of what we shall call “empathically normative” thinking, which is a non-
instrumental kind of conscious attention. Section 4 addresses the question of how to 
understand the suspension of epistemic urges that characterizes empathic thinking, 
from a philosophical perspective. In the conclusion, we tie together this 
phenomenological account with the findings on the early works of art produced by our 
species. 
2.1 THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
Our species appeared around 200,000 years ago, but in spite of extensive 
archaeological records concerning tool usage stretching back to early forms of the 
species Homo, there is no archaeological record of linguistic representation on stone 
until roughly 5,000 to perhaps 7,000 years ago (this is a liberal estimate). Nonetheless, 
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there are also extensive archaeological findings demonstrating an explosion of human 
creativity around 45,000 years ago. There is conclusive evidence of artistic creativity 
dating 70,000 to 100,000 (according to some estimates even 150,000) years ago in South 
African caves (Keim, 2014). More controversial evidence indicates that Erectus might 
have also produced art, pushing back this capacity significantly to 430,000 years (see 
Keim, 2014; and Callaway, 2014). This striking development finds one of its most 
famous manifestations in the human painted cave art found across Europe.  
In addition, a recent finding shows that Neanderthals had what seem to be spiritual 
gatherings in caves, which was very likely what humans were doing in the caves they 
decorated with art. These findings on Neanderthal potentially artistic creations date 
back to some 176,000 years ago, almost immediately after our appearance as a species 
on this planet (Callaway, 2016). The genetic resemblance between Neanderthals and 
humans is remarkable, but there seem to be key differences. Neanderthals have the 
gene FOXP2, associated with the language capacity, but there are very critical 
differences concerning brain development between our species and Neanderthals. 
Crucially, one of the key differences concerns neoteny—the postponement of changes 
or preservation of juvenile features in adults (Gunz, et al., 2010). There are other 
important differences, more specifically concerning FOXP2 (See Berwick and 
Chomsky, 151-152). Thus, the presence of FOXP2 may not indubitably determine 
human-like language skills. But the differences in neoteny are critical, as they also 
determine significant developmental differences between our species and chimpanzees, 
including the development of the neocortex (see Miller, et al., 2012), which is associated 
with categorical and goal oriented reasoning and attention. Neanderthals must have 
had some kind of advanced communication system that resembled aspects of human 
language. But what is important is that there is a contrast between the Neanderthal’s 
ostensibly confirmed capacities for empathic reasoning, as demonstrated in these 
recent cave findings, and the uncertainty there is regarding scientific findings on the 
origins of language.4 This is a critical piece of evidence in favor of the approach we 
propose here. 
To put the importance of these findings on spiritual and empathic capacities into 
perspective, consider that stone tool use, indisputably for carving meat but perhaps for 
other practical purposes, dates back to Australopithecus afarensis, 3,400,000 years ago 
(McPherron, et al., 2010). There are 3,250,000 years of stone tool use present in our 
ancestors but no evidence of artistic creativity or technology innovation. The 
                                                          
4 For clarity, we follow Berwick and Chomsky (2016) in using “language” exclusively to refer to the human 
capacity for syntax-manipulation-based communication. Thus, language is only one aspect of social 
communication, which includes empathic communication and art. 
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archaeological record shows that for most of our evolution our ancestors were 
reproducing the same plans with the same stone tool technology. They were very 
successful at strategic planning and could engage in forms of practical reasoning that 
were passed generation to generation. But there is not a hint of progress until 200,000 
years ago and nothing that demonstrates moral-spiritual capacities before the 
Neanderthal cave findings. 
But something quite dramatic happened around 150,000 to 45,000 years ago. The 
archaeological record shows our species emerging by perfecting tool making, 
innovating the inherited technology from previous ancestors, and most important, 
creating objects that had clear artistic and spiritual purposes. The record does not 
show a sudden transition to written language. Records with written language happened 
much later. What the record shows is a wide variety of creative art (or what we now call 
art), which culminates in the beautiful cave paintings of southern France. This is not 
primitive art in the aesthetic sense. On the contrary, it is intensely beautiful art. It is 
primitive only in the archaeological sense. Thus, the question is, how exactly can we 
explain this sudden and crucial development? 
According to a familiar modernist story, our astonishing rise and success as a 
species depended almost exclusively on the development of collective forms of reliable 
communication and collaboration, from agriculture, written codifications for law and 
commerce to the formation of cities, empires and states. This picture is one of linearly 
growing freedom and rationality. It is a powerful narrative that has a strong grip even 
on popular culture. The enlightenment promoted rationality and freedom as two sides 
of a progressively linear force of global understanding and non-oppression (see Taylor 
[1989] for how this narrative seeps into philosophical views about the self). Today, one 
finds similar narratives everywhere: humans have become less violent, communication 
is more complex than ever before, suffering has decreased, etc. Linguistic conceptual 
capacities and the inferential capacities they make possible are at the very foundation 
of this narrative.  
We are not interested in challenging all the different versions of this rather 
overoptimistic narrative here. Instead, we appeal to evidence in order to show that 
some of the critical developments in our evolution depended on an entirely different 
factor: a non-epistemic factor. Humans distinguished themselves not solely based on their 
epistemic rational capacities and linguistic skills. Before these skills coalesced into 
discursive rationality and the language capacity, our species marked its own path with a 
distinct form of non-epistemic thinking, a type of meditative and spiritually insightful 
thinking that left pervasive traces in the archaeological record. This was a type of 
creative thinking that led to the first forms of artistic decorations and expressions, 
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which facilitated gathering in larger and more cohesive groups, and allowed for non-
explicit or “declarative” value assessments. 
The nature and phenomenology of this type of thinking is the topic of section 3. 
Here we want to document its first appearance in our evolution, as carefully as 
possible. What we hope is clear by now, is that the archaeological record does not 
support the simple modernist narrative that we became humans when we moved out of 
caves, abandoned our cavemen mentality and started talking, naming, judging, 
competing with each other and exchanging goods. On the contrary, the evidence 
shows that we became humans by going inside caves for ritualistic purposes. We found 
ourselves inside the caves, not outside of them.5 
2.2 Evolution 
The transitions that demarcated our uniqueness as a species can be understood as 
transitions that involved different forms of attention. Based on the archaeological 
record, we can document a transition from attention routines concerning plans and 
instrumental reasoning, manifest in stone tool-making, to a more abstract form of 
attention: attention to a non-instrumental kind of thinking, manifest in cave art. Art 
engages attention and phenomenal consciousness in a very vivid and powerful way—a 
non-inferential and empathically normative way. This seems to be what initially 
demarcated the transition to Homo sapiens, coinciding with the appearance of artistic 
creations in the archaeological record. If we follow the archaeological record for some 
millennia after the first art was documented, we then find a transition from this vivid 
and engaging form of perceptual and experiential attention to a linguistically driven 
kind of attention, a conceptual kind of attention, structured by language and its 
syntactic-hierarchical elements.  
If a uniquely powerful type of conscious attention—one that is not merely depictive 
or representational, but spiritually and aesthetically engaging—is what originally 
distinguished our species, how did this form of attention become compatible with 
conceptual attention, and what was the function or purpose of this kind of engaging 
attention? With respect to the compatibility between these forms of attention, we claim 
that they coexist but that they may be entirely different in terms of their experiential 
engagement or vivacity, in accordance with the dissociation between phenomenal 
                                                          
5 This is in an entirely different approach to the typical one in contemporary philosophy of mind and 
epistemology, for instance, as described by Wilfrid Sellars (1956/1997) in his influential and captivating 
notion of the manifest image, which is a conceptually rich framework where humans “found themselves” 
as free and rational. Sellars says that before such rational capacities, we could not find ourselves in the 
manifest image. See his description of our “Rylean ancestors” in particular (90-94). 
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consciousness and attention (see Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015). Attending to 
conceptual contents opened up a vast realm of new plans for action, which we increase 
on a daily basis with new concepts (an idea which is also compatible with the notion of 
“affordance” [Gibson, 1979]). But this is part of instrumental rationality and epistemic 
interests that need not provide the experiential grip of moral and aesthetic experiences. 
In fact, these epistemic attention routines and urges hinder and inhibit our moral and 
aesthetic capacities. Conceptual and linguistic attention routines and urges have the 
function of automatizing access to semantic contents and of articulating reasons and 
propositions. Experiencing the sublime and beautiful has a very different social and 
personal function—one that we have been devaluating in the modern world as a form 
of religious backwardness, but which emerges in other contexts, such as artistic 
performances and sports events. We modern humans have devaluated what is perhaps 
most valuable about our species, much to our and our planet’s detriment. 
As the Stroop task shows, conceptual attention produces urges that enter conscious 
awareness, and they have a specific semantic content. Color perception alone need not 
come with the urge to name the color, but conceptual attention does this automatically 
for us. A conscious mind that lacks such urges simply enjoys or detects the color. The 
type of conscious attention we call empathic does not work by means of strictly 
conceptual urges, goal-oriented routines, or attention to plans. We clearly have this 
kind of empathic conscious attention and we clearly value it enormously, but it is 
constantly framed and set aside by the more urgent-concept driven attention to action 
possibilities. One may go even further and claim that it is this type of aesthetically and 
morally powerful conscious attention that makes our conscious awareness intrinsically 
valuable. (For a recent defense of the intrinsic moral value of phenomenal consciousness 
from a computational perspective, see Aaronson, 2016; Haladjian and Montemayor, 
2016).  
We became creatures of complex conceptual urges and also of complex forms of 
suppressing associated emotional urges in order to promote goals and plans, which 
allowed us to construct ever more complicated (and selfish) personal narratives, and to 
generate a vast multiplicity of action schemas. How to make sense of the compatibility 
and evolution of such different forms of conscious attention? Drawing a distinction 
between consciousness and attention can easily accommodate, and actually explain, 
these two different kinds of conscious attention (Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015). 
According to this distinction, one could explain distinct roles for attention routines in 
terms of empathic and epistemic forms of normative guidance. Actually, these different 
capacities constitute, according to this approach, two different types of agency: one 
empathically and the other epistemically oriented. 
 CARLOS MONTEMAYOR & SPENCER HORNE 63 
From an evolutionary point of view, the most plausible interpretation of the 
available evidence is that basic attention routines for navigation and motor control 
(including basic forms of instrumental reasoning) evolved much earlier, and 
independently, from symbolic conceptual attention (which is probably formatted 
linguistically) and even from phenomenal consciousness and its intrinsic moral and 
aesthetic value (see Haladjian and Montemayor, 2015, for discussion on the evolution of 
attention that includes insect navigation). This issue, in the context of the 
archaeological findings, suggests that phenomenal consciousness evolved after these 
early forms of perceptual attention to features, but also before symbolic-linguistic 
attention. Thus, phylogenetically, there are strong reasons to distinguish phenomenal 
conscious attention as prior to linguistic symbolic attention. Moreover, even at the 
ontogeny level, one can find a version of  “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” The few 
months infant certainly has vivid conscious experiences related to moral value, for 
instance of pain, but the type of linguistically driven attention to contents, and later to 
the intentions and thoughts of others, does not fully mature until a few years of age. In 
support of this claim, evidence shows that communication of emotions in infants is pre-
linguistic, and resembles communication in bonobos (Clay, et al., 2015). 
2.3 Art, empathy, and a new form of conscious attention 
The type of basic action-guiding attention needed for intentional planning is already at 
work in our stone tool-making ancestors. Our species developed the first kind of artistic 
creations more recently. This new type of conscious attention toward artistic, moral, 
and spiritual value had a profound impact on our cognition. It is clear that after those 
initial moments of creative engagement, we started gathering in larger groups. Only 
later, within a time frame of less than 10,000 years ago, one finds indisputable evidence 
of written language. As mentioned, at the phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels one finds 
the distinction between empathic conscious attention and symbolic conscious attention. 
But even at an introspective level, there are documented stories of people with 
psychopathologies or brain injuries in which the linguistically driven or “chatty” 
conceptual attention routines are impaired or eliminated, enabling a more pure and 
intense form of empathic conscious attention.6 
The transformative event our species experienced when empathic attention 
became a normal function of our cognitive capacities truly deserves the name of 
radically transformative experience. Our cognitive life is different when it becomes intensely 
                                                          
6 Jill Bolte Taylor offers dramatic descriptions of such experiences. See section 3.2 for how these 
experiences can be characterized in terms of the suspension of epistemic urges. 
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shared and inherently valuable. What humans learned how to experience was a more 
meditative engagement with the world around them, in a way that went beyond the 
veridicality conditions provided by the world. In it, as the cave paintings show, humans 
were not neatly placed at the center of everything, trying to tame nature and drawing 
inferential judgments from evidence. Their engagement with those beautiful paintings 
was not merely representational either. Animals were admired and revered. Humans 
were represented as continuous with the animal world and they were artistically 
depicted as having animal parts. The tendency to linguistically document information 
on stone and other media does not occur until 5000 years ago. The great advantage of 
having vast realms of symbolic possibilities out of finite strings of symbols had a 
negative side: it never stops. Our epistemic capacities overwhelmed our previous 
empathic ones, and today it is even more so than any time before.  
What distinguished our species was a deep empathic connection with each other 
and with the world at large, including a spiritual reverence toward those who died. We 
were better at connecting than Neanderthals: we were more spiritual, gathered in 
bigger groups, and shared our emotions more powerfully. There is evidence that 
humans had music at this stage of their evolution. Flutes have been found along the 
first artistic objects our species created. We enjoyed our presence in the world perhaps 
much more than any of our ancestors. Neanderthals had genes for language production 
and an on average larger brain. But there is no evidence of symbolic systems in 
Neanderthals. Although they may have had experiences that resemble our feelings of 
empathy and aesthetic value, they didn’t seem to achieve the level of artistic and social 
sophistication our species achieved at its earliest stages. 
It is difficult to explain this empathic type of thinking in detail without appealing to 
phenomenological considerations. As a species, we now need to imagine somehow 
those early transitional moments that preceded the conceptual and linguistic explosion, 
without imposing too much of our current perspective. Fortunately, phenomenologists 
and contemplative traditions have developed rigorous ways of describing such abstract 
and insightful thinking without appealing to concepts and language. The 
phenomenological proposal presented in the next section explains why Heidegger, in 
particular, might have suggested a similar distinction between linguistic/epistemic and 
empathic thinking and also that empathic thinking is social and morally relevant, in a 
fundamental way. 
An important aspect of the phenomenological account we are about to present is 
that the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and attention justifies a 
structural requirement that helps elucidate the nature of empathic thinking. Attention 
routines are susceptible of being programmable because they halt at a certain threshold 
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(e.g., the feature has been detected or identified, the goal has been achieved). But 
phenomenal consciousness operates differently, always allowing for new and surprising 
ways of experiencing contents even if the contents are the same—it integrates 
information in order to engage the organism in a valuable and meaningful, ongoing way. 
Phenomenal consciousness and one’s personal narrative are not susceptible of being 
programmed, and they are not reducible to halting functions. This may be the most 
important reason why phenomenal consciousness cannot be programmed, copied or 
reproduced. This is also why phenomenal consciousness is unique and why we take it 
to be what makes our lives morally valuable (see Aaronson, 2016; Haladjian and 
Montemayor, 2016), partly because it opens our minds to how others may be engaged 
by similar experiences. 
3 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF NON-EPISTEMICALLY DRIVEN 
THINKING 
We offer a theoretical characterization of the phenomenology of meditative thinking in 
this section, based on an interpretation of Heidegger’s distinction between techne and 
poiesis. We also provide a philosophical characterization of the psychological process of 
suspending epistemic urges, which is important to understand the phenomenology of 
empathic thinking. Heidegger’s criticism of what he referred to as representational 
thinking (or “representationalism”7) relates to the “meditative thinking” that he began 
to articulate during the mid-1930s.8  Even though meditative thinking may be a rare 
phenomenon in the modern world, we argue that it is a more basic and fundamental 
state of consciousness akin to the immediate empathic guidance of moral and aesthetic 
experiences. 
 
                                                          
7 Note that representationalism here has a far broader definition than its use in contemporary analytic 
philosophy. As Heidegger sees it, nearly every philosopher after Descartes (with the notable exception of 
Nietzsche) falls into this category. We will not defend a thorough rejection of representationalism, but we 
will explain why Heidegger’s criticism is useful in understanding empathic guidance. For Nietzsche’s 
criticism of representationalism and scientism in relation to nihilism and in the context of a similar 
discussion, see Gare (2012).  
8 Heidegger’s terminology for what we call “meditative thinking” varies over this period in his writing. 
One of his terminological variations on this idea is the term poietic, from the Greek ποίησις, a term 
referring to the process of creation. Heidegger makes a philologically based argument that the Greeks 
opposed ποίησις with τέχνη, the first term denoting a creation in the strict sense of a coming into 
existence. He grounds this manner of thinking in pre-Socratic thought, a period categorically immune to 
the rationalism introduced by Plato. Τέχνη on the other hand is creation in accordance with an epistemic 
blueprint or plan. This distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction between empathic conscious 
attention and epistemic attention.  
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For Heidegger, representationalism was rooted in at least two basic features: first, 
the notion of a correspondence between representation and truth, which he traces to 
Platonism and second, the insertion of a metaphysical cleft between mind and world, 
the conception of mind which became dominant after Descartes. While this is a 
controversial interpretation of modern philosophy, what we want to emphasize is that 
representationalism, on Heidegger’s account, is a deeply epistemological view of the 
mind that emphasizes linguistic and epistemic attention. Thought has itself become a 
techne, according to this view: rote and methodological, an act taken to be as valuable 
as it adheres to the epistemic framework it projects—or to use the more contemporary 
expression mentioned above, thought has become programmable. In Heidegger’s 
diagnosis, this view of thinking is culturally and historically grounded in the post-
Platonic ontotheological metaphysical tradition. More important, according to 
Heidegger, such mode of thinking is not a necessary feature of human cognition. We 
disagree with this strong claim, but also believe that there is a deep insight in it: human 
cognition is not reducible to such epistemic thinking. A necessary component, 
independent of such epistemic thinking, is empathic thinking.  
It is well known that Heidegger’s view resonates with embodied and extended 
views of the mind, and that his criticism of representationalism can be used to criticize 
the computational-representational view of the mind. This is a plausible and influential 
way of reinterpreting epistemological thinking. Our phenomenological analysis, 
however, focuses on the non-epistemic nature of what Heidegger calls “meditative 
thinking” in order to account for empathic, rather than epistemic guidance, regardless 
of whether or not such guidance is characterized as extended or embodied. 
Heidegger’s criticism of technology is a criticism of thought taken to be the re-
presenting of already-known entities, i.e. concepts, traceable back to the eides of Plato 
(which are already known to us and accessible through recollection). To think 
calculatively is to approach the world in terms that one is already familiar with. 
Thought conceived of as representation is the ground of calculative thinking, a manner 
of thinking that projects a rigorous and reliable fixed epistemic construction, the act of 
“enframing” (gestell), upon the world. For Heidegger, meditative thinking allows us the 
possibility to reestablish a relationship with Being, a relationship that has nearly 
entirely dissipated due to humanity’s preoccupation with conceiving of the world 
representationally and has led to a modern age characterized by its forgetfulness of the 
question of Being. The gain of overcoming representation can be seen as therapeutic: it 
is an overcoming of metaphysics and the epistemology that grounds our age of 
technology and calculation, and a different way of guiding our minds, one that is more 
engaging. It provides a way of engaging one’s phenomenal consciousness as a whole, 
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allowing us to reconnect with the world of moral and aesthetic value without the 
constant interferences and reminders of epistemic attention. 
Meditative thought allows the world to unconceal itself in a poietic manner, a 
manner that allows for the creation of meaning and sense-making relations in the 
world and with others.9 Rather than allowing the world to present itself poieticly, the 
world is known to the representing mind calculatively in terms of re-presented entities 
projected as an epistemic-inferential framework of conceptual relations upon the world. 
Meditative thought, therefore, captures the nature of aesthetic and moral experiences 
while what Heidegger calls techne better captures epistemic guidance. 
How to understand this “openness to others” that empathic thinking affords 
through phenomenal consciousness?  We propose a reading of Heidegger’s empathic 
thinking based on the notion of “secondary intersubjectivity” (see Gallagher and 
Jacobson, 2012). According to such reading, there is a first level of intersubjectivity or 
“openness” to the world, based on sensory-motor and embodied emotional interactions 
with others. Then there is a more empathically basic, secondary intersubjectivity, 
which involves the other in a fundamental way, even if there were no “others” in the 
world. On this account, Heidegger’s analysis of intersubjectivity suffers from a 
thorough understanding of primary intersubjectivity, which prevents a full explanation 
of how embodied and meaningful perception constitutes the more phenomenologically 
robust openness to others, associated with secondary intersubjectivity. But we use this 
distinction only to highlight the epistemic and empathic dimensions of intersubjectivity 
by noting that primary intersubjectivity plays a largely epistemic role, while secondary 
intersubjectivity, on our account, plays a largely empathic role in which epistemic 
routines are “suspended.”10 Thus, the criticism of Heidegger based on this distinction 
does not concern us here, since our focus is to understand why meditative thinking is 
empathic and why this means it must be other-involving. 
Moral and aesthetic experiences not only open us to others, they also do so by 
enhancing our perspective on the world in a way that appeases the mind. Learning to 
think meditatively takes the character of a quieting of the mind, a kind of waiting and 
listening free of epistemic content, though for Heidegger this “silence” would be 
                                                          
9 There is a reading of Aristotle’s On Poetics, according to which intentional action in a morally meaningful 
setting must always be understood in terms of poetry (the structure of tragedy, in particular). We only 
highlight this connection without making it part of our argument because of the broader meaning that 
poetry had in ancient Greece (see Davis, 2002). 
10 Gallagher and Jacobson do not clearly distinguish epistemic urges and instrumental attention routines 
from empathic and comprehensive forms of conscious attention. But the above distinction helps clarify the 
issue of subjectivity in the context of empathic experiences. For a clear account of these two forms of 
cognition (epistemic and empathic) and their neuroscientific and historical basis see McGilchrist (2009). 
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something one could carry with them in all their daily social affairs. Silence and 
contemplative practice can have the value of letting the world show itself to the thinker 
independently of sensory-motor and other epistemic-attentional routines. It seems that, 
because of the evidence examined above, Heidegger may have been characterizing a 
mode of thinking that distinguished our species before we developed linguistic forms of 
reasoning. Clearing the mind of conceptual and epistemic contents as a therapeutic or 
soteriological act is nothing new in Western philosophy—it has well-known and deep 
roots in Eastern philosophies (and as a spiritual practice it may very well be as old as 
language itself). Heidegger’s discussions on thinking bear resemblance to the Christian 
apophatic theological tradition, including Meister Eckhart from whom Heidegger 
appropriates the term gelassenheit (Country Path Conversations 1944/1945 [2010]). Often 
translated as “releasement,” this term refers to an attitude of thought in which the 
thinker is able to simply let things be, releasing them from epistemic goals. Thinking as 
gelassenheit allows fundamental attunement to Being in which the will dissipates, 
ceasing the activity of representational projection inherently bound to the will, at the 
same time appeasing and opening the mind to others, including their moral value and 
needs. Calculative thinking not only projects a conceptual framework, but also 
constitutes an act of epistemic dissection as an eager undertaking of the will.  
Yet the move to gelassenheit, a move away from active willing, doesn’t lead one to 
a state of passivity. Rather than projecting frameworks of representational 
understanding upon the world, the thinker is open to en-think Being (to use the 
language of the Contributions to Philosophy 1989). En-thinking (Er-denken) is described in 
the Contributions as something akin to an enrapturing.11 Being and the thinking subject 
mutually appropriate one another in the process of thinking. All of our most vivid and 
valuable experiences, such as falling in love or seeing a beautiful landscape, transcend 
simple conceptualizations in exactly this way. Such experiences certainly played a role 
in the development of early cave art, and the experiences associated with the creation 
and admiration of cave art were likely much more intense than our normal experiences 
of art at museums. “Enrapturing” is a proper term for such experiences. The powerful 
images painted on walls deep inside these caves are not mere depictions of hunting 
“strategies,” or “ways of categorizing” animals for consumption. They are, rather, the 
                                                          
11 Heidegger rarely speaks of thinking in the Contributions as dependent on the prescriptive “bracketing” of 
language. Thinking tends to be discussed in the most abstract of terms. Though in his own commentary 
on the Contributions, The Event, this prescription begins to appear: “Exclude for once mere description, 
which always takes refuge only in “beings,” forbid mere reports, which are given over only to the past, 
desist from plans and calculations, which are attached only to the immediate future – and then still try to 
think and speak. Then to you it is as if there were nothing. Yet then to you would be what is: beyng.” 
(2013, 103) 
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first time our species produced something poetically, and was captured by the intensity 
of an image for no other reason than to experience vividly its aesthetic and empathic 
value.  
The demands of art are normative, social, and spiritual. Heidegger’s meditative 
thinking suggests the possibility of a manner of mental comportment with a rich 
phenomenal character, engaged in meaningful relations with the world, which involves 
neither an active projection nor passive reception of conceptual content. We believe 
that meditative thinking closely correlates with what we call “empathic normativity” or 
“empathic guidance.” We do not suggest that Heidegger’s meditative thinking is a 
process fully independent of linguistic content. Heidegger associates meditative poietic 
thought with language, yet its linguistic content is not fixed in accordance with 
established conceptual rules. Rather, as the world is able to show itself in new, even 
irrational ways, sense making is a purely creative process instead of one unfolding 
within the confines of preexisting conceptual and linguistic norms, as in poetry. 
Without concepts to re-present content, the mind is open to the possibility of new 
meanings, and an open creativity with which to establish relations of sense. None of 
this is to say that there isn’t conceptual content in consciousness, only that there need 
not be if we take Heidegger’s diagnosis to heart. The suggestion is that the calculative 
reasoning whose representational nature is grounded in epistemology arises out of a 
more basic and primordial phenomenology, which is intrinsically valuable.  
There is an alternative way of understanding the relation between empathic and 
epistemic guidance that appeals to concepts. Fleshing out this theory obviously will 
depend on the kind of commitments one has in mind (embodied or representational). 
But the general idea is that, necessarily, empathic thinking involves phenomenal 
concepts, while epistemic thinking does not necessitate phenomenal concepts. Whether 
empathic guidance should be understood conceptually or non-conceptually is an issue 
that we leave open, given the complexities of proving a definitive theory of concepts. 
But if it is correct that empathic guidance as a mental capacity is an older feature of 
our conscious minds than linguistic-epistemic thought, then we ought to look at 
meditative thought as a means to recover a capacity that is older and more 
fundamental to our species. In Heidegger’s analysis of modernity, the dominance of 
representational thought, manifesting most prominently as scientific thinking, is not a 
necessary characteristic of the human mind. Its prominence is a rather recent 
development, and its value has social rather than “ontological” origins.       
In Heidegger’s system we find an interplay between meditative thought (which 
discloses the world poietically) and representational thought (which discloses the world 
technically). World-disclosure as techne, using Heidegger’s terminology, may be the 
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dominant mode in today’s world, but our indoctrination into such thinking need not be 
absolute or permanent. The poietic unconcealment of the world produced by 
meditative thought is (at least partially) the result of a sustained and heedful attention. 
Just as one can learn to think meditatively, attention can be trained to deepen. 
Epistemic urges need not dominate our mental life. The ethical dimensions of the 
suspension of epistemic urges in ancient thought are discussed in the next section. 
These are analogical, imagistic, and fundamentally empathic forms of thinking.  
4 PYRRHONISM AND THE PRACTICE OF SUSPENDING EPISTEMIC 
URGES 
Heidegger offers us a useful analogue to the empathic/epistemic distinction in that he 
had the history of modern philosophy behind him and thus was able to present his 
theory while taking contemporary epistemic and metaphysical notions to the fore. 
However, the Pyrrhonist skepticism outlined by Sextus Empiricus provides, we suggest, 
an ancient counterpart to our proposal, which has implications for aesthetic and moral 
value appreciation.12 On our account, the advantage of Pyrrhonian skepticism is that it 
allows for the suspension of epistemic urges, such as those involved in assertion, 
judgment and conceptual categorization. As we illustrated with the Stroop task, these 
urges can be prominent in our conscious awareness and they tend to operate 
automatically. So it is not a trivial question what suspending those urges might amount 
to. 
The Pyrrhonists were motivated primarily by an ethical and soteriological 
inclination, rather than by the strict epistemic considerations characteristic of modern 
skeptical approaches. The Pyrrhonists inherited a basic theory of sense impressions and 
knowledge from the stoics: through our sense organs we receive sensory impressions, 
from there we have an intellectual understanding of these impressions (i.e., a grasp of 
their content), and based on the understandings of these impressions we can choose 
whether or not to accept the truth of their content. The stoics were all too willing to 
assign a truth value to the contents of their impressions when one has, the skeptic 
argues, still reason to doubt the truth of our understanding of them, and thus reason to 
refrain from accepting them. Instead of giving assent to beliefs that we have reason to 
doubt, the skeptic continues inquiry. But the Pyrrhonist refrains from the pursuits of 
                                                          
12 There are in fact many instances of philosophical schools and contemplative traditions that made use of 
notions similar to the empathic/epistemic distinction. The apophatic Christian mythology of the middle 
ages falling in the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius provides a wealth of information on non-epistemic states 
of spiritual consciousness. The anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing equates the mind free of any 
representational epistemic content as unitive knowledge of God itself.  
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the traditional dyadic cycle of epistemic commitment and the corresponding urges to 
accept by eradicating doubt or to deny acceptance by withholding judgment 
dogmatically.13 Thus, it is essential to note that the Pyrrhonist’s cessation of epistemic 
judgments is very different from the denial of the truth of a given proposition. 
The goal of this practice is far more profound than merely avoiding mistaken truth 
ascriptions. The skeptic is motivated by a desire to attain a state of ataraxia, the 
tranquility that ensues when we can free ourselves from the anxiety of epistemically 
motivated commitment, epistemic vigilance and monitoring, or epistemically guided 
attention. Avoiding epistemic commitment and related epistemic urges is, according to 
the skeptic, good for one’s well-being. The suspension of judgment in epistemic matters 
is the suspension of unnecessary attachments, and a reduction of attachments is a 
reduction of stress on one’s psychology. The image of our species as hyper-rational 
obscures the importance of this form of thinking that suspends epistemic urges, which 
is essential for meditative thinking, aesthetic experiences and moral empathy.  
Why is this relevant to the previous discussion on phenomenology? We can think of 
knowledge for the skeptic as scientific world disclosure in Heidegger, as a mental act 
requiring the representation of conceptualized entities accompanied with specific 
epistemic routines and commitments (i.e., inferential and attention routines geared 
towards endorsement or denial). Like the Heideggerian non-epistemic meditative 
thinking achieved through the releasement of the thinker from these epistemic 
routines, we believe that the skeptic state of tranquility is akin to the empathic mode of 
consciousness we have identified with meditative thinking. Ataraxia is brought about 
by a suspension of epistemic commitment, yet the skeptic still enjoys a kind of 
consciousness endowed with a rich phenomenal content. Epistemic processes can be 
suspended without leading to an empty or inactive mind. Actually, the suspension of 
epistemic urges is necessary to have an active and engaged mind that is not obsessed 
with instrumental and rational manipulation and optimization. 
                                                          
13 In the last few decades there has been debate as to whether or not the skeptics freed themselves of all 
beliefs rather than eliminating only unnecessary metaphysical beliefs. Some argue that the skeptics had 
absolutely no beliefs at all – this is the traditional reading of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Others argue that the 
skeptics did in fact have beliefs about the world, but these beliefs were only about the way things appear 
(phenomena), not about the way things actually are (see Frede, 1987). We do not take a stance on which 
interpretation of Sextus Empiricus’ view is accurate, for even if it is the case that the skeptic had basic 
beliefs about appearances (and in a sense we must always have beliefs about bodily states like hunger or 
thirst), the skeptic attains a tranquil state of mind, a state of existence distinct from those of the stoic (or 
even the everyday person committed to the truth of their beliefs), by the habitual avoidance of epistemic 
thinking. In either interpretation the skeptic lives in accordance with phenomenal appearances, not with 
representational contents that require epistemic commitment via judgment or explicit endorsement. 
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In fact, there is a deeper connection with phenomenology here. The Pyrrhonist 
method of refraining from taking up beliefs, the epoche, is a critical part of modern 
phenomenology. Edmund Husserl famously adopted the term epoche, for whom the 
term refers to the methodological “bracketing off ” of prior assumptions for any given 
intentional content.14 While Husserl’s method of using a phenomenological epoche to 
ground knowledge of objects may not on the face of it resemble the Pyrrhonist 
therapeutic goal of bracketing assumptions and beliefs to clear the mind of epistemic 
routines and representations, some have read into Husserl’s philosophy a therapeutic 
agenda. The mathematician Gian Carlo Rota (1997) read into Husserl and Heidegger’s 
phenomenological projects a therapeutic inclination. As Rota reads these philosophers, 
their projects serve to help the student overcome what he calls “reductionist anxiety,” a 
state of literal anxiety stemming from the drive to reduce phenomena to other 
phenomena, a desire that characterizes epistemic urges and commitments. Giving up 
reductionist desires does not mean giving up understanding or thinking, and it allows 
phenomenal consciousness to free itself from being dragged away by what the 
epistemic mind is judging, categorizing and representing.  
5 CONCLUSION: EMPATHIC CREATION AS A NON-INSTRUMENTAL 
ENGAGEMENT 
Engaged interest and creativity are essential to the notion of empathic guidance. In 
Heidegger’s most explicit discussion of art, The Origin of  the Work of  Art, the work of art 
itself works to open up a world, in order to establish values and norms with immediate 
grip on our phenomenally conscious awareness. The artwork itself works to provide a 
world. The way this world is constructed and the way we see this world constitutes the 
way the artwork works. Heidegger’s famous discussions of Vincent van Gogh’s painting 
of mud covered wooden shoes explains how an object from daily life becomes 
noticeable in a new and engaging way, which is not reducible to epistemic 
categorizations. Similarly to cave art, the painter is not merely depicting or 
representing, or categorizing events from memory. The painter, rather, is helping 
herself and others transcend such categories by creating a new way of experiencing the 
world, a way in which our experience of it is intrinsically valuable. 
In his recent work on aesthetics, Strange Tools, Alva Noë presents his own version of 
Heidegger’s project, updating the non-instrumentalist/rationalist view and taking into 
                                                          
14 Heidegger too incorporates an epoche in his philosophy, however the mention is brief. In a lecture given 
in 1969 in Le Thor he equates the letting of Being present itself with an epoche. To let Being be, the 
thinker must in a sense bracket off all epistemic content, even understandings of Being itself (see Four 
Seminars 1986).   
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account neurological and cognitive theories that attempt to explain aesthetic 
experiences. For Noë, analogously to language and epistemic activities that are 
organized according to rules, the ways in which we see and understand the world are 
also organized. Humanity’s long-standing relationship with pictorial images has shaped 
the way we look at the world and ourselves. Though the hands on practice of the 
creation of an artistic object may unfold in accordance with organizational structures, 
the object as a work of art provides those that encounter it new ways of seeing. Art thus 
serves to re-organize the way that we see and understand the world, changing the 
structures that characterize our experiences.   
 Noë claims that contemplative seeing, “thoughtful inspection or visual evaluation,” 
is something we receive from our engagement with pictures (Noë, 2015, 51). This 
contemplative aesthetic seeing contrasts with “seeing in the wild,” what he takes to be 
the natural way of seeing, an embodied and non-contemplative response to the world. 
But what about humanity’s earliest works of art, which are the focus of our analysis? 
Was it art that granted us the ability to see in a contemplative way, rather than 
linguistic or other epistemic ways of inspecting images? Noë’s account is silent on this 
issue, and seems to concern subjects viewing art in galleries. For us, aesthetic 
experience is not simply a form of visual evaluation or judgment, in which we merely 
abstract from the practical. This abstraction is necessary, but not sufficient. Art is 
valuable because it is a transcendental form of engagement with the world and others, 
rather than a non-instrumental form of judgment. Interestingly, Noë calls the patterns of 
organization that lead to non-instrumental reasoning “technologies” (Noë, 2015, 19), 
claiming that breast-feeding is a technology in virtue of the organized structure that 
unfolds between the interactions of the mother and infant (“Techne is at work in that 
original organized activity of suckling,” 2015, 24). 
Thus, although there is overlap between our and Noë’s views, Noë’s concept of 
reorganization might be too epistemic of a notion. In any case, his conception of 
technology seems to fit what we called earlier “primary intersubjectivity.” For him art is 
a “strange tool,” distinct from other tools in that it provides a new way of seeing, a 
newness founded in a strangeness that arises from aesthetic contemplation. Although 
our proposal may be compatible with this general characterization of aesthetic value, 
we believe that the suspension of the epistemic, theoretical and instrumental approach 
to life is what is key. We believe a similar explanation can be provided for moral value 
and the intrinsic value found in the world of early human art, displayed on artistic 
creations and ceremonial burials. Early human art manifests empathic guidance and 
meditative thinking. It also manifests the origin of spirituality. Early human artistic 
creations and the experiences they made possible were much more intense than any 
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contemporary art gallery experience. They created an intense sharing of experiences 
and a new relation to the world. These are the two main aspects of our 
characterization of empathic guidance: it is non-epistemic and it is transcendental in 
the sense that the value of conscious experience is primitive or intrinsic in art and in 
the lives of others in a way that transcends truth accuracy or description. Our goal in 
this paper was twofold: to document and to identify this kind of empathic guidance in 
the archaeological record, and to provide a philosophical and historical account of this 
crucial human capacity.  
Ultimately, this issue should not merely be a scientific empirical thesis that requires 
verification. Our lives have become more mechanized, manipulable and even 
programmable through public policy and education than ever before in our evolution. 
To make things much worse, with the prospect of general artificial intelligence looming 
on the horizon, even our obsessive epistemic minds are in jeopardy. Recovering our 
intense moral and aesthetic relation to the world is not just a matter of reorientation; it 
is also a matter of survival. We find ourselves in an ironic situation. Back in the cave 
period, our ancestors painted beautiful images for no immediate epistemic or survival 
purpose, other than to create a world of intense value, which they could enjoy and 
share through their mystical gatherings. Now, we must regain those experiences of 
intense unity with others and with the world if we want to overcome the mechanical 
and indifferent existence we have created—a much more immediate and selfish need. 
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